In the holy interest of Science, we submit our recent systemic democratic peace research to the control variable doctrine of James Lee Ray, as codified in his 2003 treatise. In particular, we seek to determine whether international institutions intervene in the relationship between the democratic community's strength and the use and effectiveness of third party conflict management, whether US hegemony is a competing explanation of third party settlement, and whether our extant model is robust when several control variables are specified. Two important conclusions are reached: 1) the democratic community's strength and institutional vitality promote third party mediation and its success; regardless of American might and other controls, and 2) Ray's teaching is properly understood as an exhortation for scholars to more carefully consider the theoretical role of each control variable and its proper treatment in statistical models, not as an edict banning the use of control variables.
Introduction
In the holy interest of Science, we herein submit our recent systemic democratic peace research to the control variable doctrine of James Lee Ray, as exposited in his 2002 Presidential Address to the Peace Science Society (International) and codified in his subsequent treatise (2003) . Our purposes are to provide a concrete example of the application of Ray's doctrine, to demonstrate the consequences for adherents and heretics, and to inform a broader research agenda on the systemic origins of Kant's perpetual peace.
1 Ray (2003) exhorts followers of Science to adhere to five tenets when using control variables:
• Do not control for intervening variables (p. 4).
• Distinguish between complementary and competing explanatory factors (p. 6).
• Do not introduce factors as control variables merely on the grounds that they have an impact on the dependent variable (p. 13).
• Do not control for variables that are related to each other or the key explanatory factor by definition (p. 15).
• Control for possible differences between across space and over time relationships (p. 20) .
We follow Ray's advice by applying these guidelines to our own systemic democratic peace work (Mitchell, Kadera, & Crescenzi, 2004) . In particular, we seek to determine whether international institutions intervene in the relationship between the democratic community's strength and the use and effectiveness of third party conflict management.
We also explore one important alternative explanation for our findings, US hegemony.
Next, we provide information about the robustness of our findings across various model specifications. Finally, we offer conclusions regarding the realization of global democratic peace as well as general lessons for following the precepts of good research.
Previous Research on the Systemic Democratic Peace
Recent scholarship identifies a systemic relationship between democracy and conflict (Crescenzi & Enterline, 1999; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Kadera, Crescenzi, & Shannon, 2003; Mitchell, Gates, & Hegre, 1999; Oneal & Russett, 1999; Starr, 1992) . As was the case for research on dyadic democratic peace, the robustness of the empirical finding invokes deeper questions about the causal processes underlying the phenomenon. Our research (Mitchell, Kadera, & Crescenzi, 2004) emphasizes third party conflict management as an important causal mechanism producing systemic peace.
Our theory builds upon ideas developed by Mitchell (2002) and Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon (2003) . The crux of our argument is that democracies are better able to promote their norms of interaction in the international system when the democratic community is powerful. Like Mitchell (2002) , we focus on one important democratic norm, the willingness to involve third parties in the conflict management process. We contend that a strong democratic community enhances the chances for third party involvement and bolsters the effectiveness of such conflict management efforts.
Third party conflict management becomes more likely and more effective because a strong democratic community reduces contractual uncertainty and establishes expectations about the sanctity of contracts.
Following Oneal (1999, 2001) (Hensel, 2001; Hensel, Mitchell, & Sowers, 2004) . For analyses in this paper, the universe of cases includes all peaceful attempts to settle a contentious issue claim (n = 1021). These peaceful attempts can either be bilateral negotiations or can involve third parties in binding (arbitration and adjudication) or non-binding (mediation, inquiry, conciliation, etc.) ways. Our first dependent variable, 3PCM, indicates when third parties are employed in peaceful settlement attempts. We also use three measures for the success of third party efforts: whether the contending parties reach an agreement, whether any agreement reached is complied with within five years, and whether any agreement reached ends the overall contentious issue at stake.
To operationalize systemic democracy, we used DemCom, a variable created by Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon (2003) Our original models are presented in the first columns of Tables 1, 3 , 4, and 5.
These initial results suggest that third party conflict management is more frequent (Table   1 ) and more likely to produce agreements (Table 3) when the democratic community is strong. However, the democratic community does not seem to influence whether these agreements end contention over the issue at stake (Table 4) or whether disputants comply with them (Table 5 ). Resolution of issues and compliance are instead achieved through disputants' membership in international organizations with pacific principles (Tables 4   and 5 ).
We wondered to what extent our results would be altered if we took seriously the guidelines put forward by Ray (2003) . In the remainder of the paper, we discuss each guideline, save one 3 , identify ways to address each issue in the context of our own research, and then present empirical findings on each point. "One should not control for a factor that is (1) a consequence of a key causal variable, and which then in turn (2) has an impact on the outcome variable" (Ray, 2003, 5) . Any observed relationship between X and Y may be washed out by inclusion of the intervening factor.
In our research, for example, it might be possible that international institutions intervene in the relationship between democratic community strength and third party conflict management: DemCom JointIOs 3PCM. Alternatively, if international organizations are effective agents for the promotion of democratic norms and institutions (e.g. Pevehouse, 2002a Pevehouse, , 2002b Shannon, 2004) , it is possible for the relationship to be reversed, namely that the strength of the democratic community intervenes in the relationship between JointIOs and 3PCM, or JointIOs DemCom 3PCM. 4 In both cases, inclusion of the two variables in the same model could diminish the effects of either one.
To get a handle on this, we estimate three models for third party conflict management use and success: 1) a model with DemCom and JointIOs, 2) a model with
DemCom alone, and 3) a model with only JointIOs. The results for the likelihood of third party conflict management are presented in Table 1 . Institutions and democratic community strength both have significant and positive effects on third party settlement attempts. Given the relatively low correlation between these two variables in the entire sample (ρ = 0.1991), this is not surprising. Thus, it does not matter whether the variables are modeled individually or jointly; the effects are the same.
We see a similar pattern for two of the three success measures, reaching agreements (Table 3 ) and agreements ending the overall claim (Table 4) . Increases in the strength of the democratic community enhance the likelihood that agreements are struck, while joint institutions have no effect. These results are robust across various model specifications. With respect to compliance, we do see slightly different results depending on model specification. In the full original model, which included four control variables (Model 1 of Table 5 ), democratic community strength was negatively and significantly related to compliance (contrary to our theory). Joint institutions, on the other hand, had a positive and significant effect. When we eliminate the control variables (Model 2 in Table 5 ), the DemCom parameter becomes indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the democratic community's deleterious effect on compliance may have been merely an artifact of model specification.
In general, however, our original results seem to be supported. A strong democratic community enhances the use of third party conflict management and the likelihood that such efforts will produce agreements, while joint institutions encourage both the use of 3PCM and compliance with agreements reached. Consistent with recent arguments about institutions creating durable peace (e.g. Fortna, 2004; Walter, 2001 ), institutions seem to play an important role in enforcement.
Identifying the distinct role of international organizations does not fully solve the chicken-and-egg problem we initially identified. The question remains: does the democratic community gain strength and then create institutions to foster cooperation and spread its norms; or do international organizations come first, managing conflict and creating a tranquil environment which nurtures a vigorous democratic community?
Several scholars make a similar reverse-causality argument, namely that peace provides a milieu in which democratic regimes flourish (Gates, Knutsen, & Moses 1996; James, Solberg, & Wolfson 1999; Thompson 1996; Rasler & Thompson 2004) . In an additional attempt to establish whether we have an intervening variable at work, we created a system level time series from 1900-2001, TotalIOs. This is the yearly number of state memberships in institutions that call for peaceful dispute settlement. 5 We then conduct What actually happens when Hegemony enters our statistical models? In every specification where Hegemony and DemCom are both predictors of third parties as mediators, DemCom is no longer significant (see Table 2 ). Equally problematic, though in different ways, are the consequences for predicting the three success outcomes.
Despite Hegemony's insignificant effect on the realization of agreements when DemCom is not in the model (Model 8 in Table 3 ), it becomes negative and statistically significant when sharing the explanatory task with the strength of the democratic community (Models 5, 6, and 7 in Table 3 ). Clearly, American power does not bring agreements to fruition. Rather, the strength of the democratic community, whose coefficient is positive and statistically significant across all specifications in Table 3 , achieves that outcome.
For ending claims, the measure of US might remains positive and significant across all four models (Models 5 through 8 of Table 4 ), but DemCom's contribution shifts from being insignificant to having a disturbing negative and statistically significant impact.
Turning to compliance, we note that neither Hegemony nor DemCom plays a predictive role in isolation from the other (model 3 and model 8 9 in Table 5 We renounce hegemony as a competing explanation for democratic peace.
Virtually without effect on international organizations' contribution to third party use and success, it offers no contest. Hegemony also does not vie with a strong democratic community: our theory subsumes a Pax Americana explanation. Because the hegemon's role is not "clearly distinguished theoretically" (Ray, 2003, 10) , its inclusion in a model that also uses DemCom is unwarranted.
Tenet #3: Do not introduce factors as control variables merely on the grounds that they have an impact on the dependent variable.
According to Ray, decisions such as ours to include a battery of control variables are unwise and particularly egregious when the rationale is "brief and cryptic" (2003, 13).
Ray argues that Tenet 3 is a corollary of Tenets 1 and 2: throwing everything into a model except the kitchen sink "obscures the distinctions between confounding variables, intervening variables, and alternative causal factors" (Ray, 2003, 13) . Even the faithful might wonder if the line separating carefully theorized explanatory variables from ad hoc control variables is blurred. Achen seeks to clarify the distinction by advocating the "Rule of Three," which limits researchers to no more than three explanatory variables, particularly if the theory is verbal and not based on a formal model (2002).
10
Our research seems to be problematic on both fronts, because we include more than three independent variables (we have six) and our theory is constructed verbally (although it does build upon a dynamic mathematical model in Kadera, Crescenzi, & Shannon, 2003) . Being schooled in the King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2004) propose a solution to this problem of model specification. As they note, scholars typically run a series of models, pick the best fitting ones, and publish these stellar results in academic journals. "The problem for researchers is how to convince readers that we picked the right specification or at least a representative one rather than the one that most supported our favorite hypothesis" (Ho et al., 2004, 1) . Ho and his colleagues advocate the use of nonparametric techniques (matching) to preprocess the data before parametric techniques are applied; the preprocessed data are less sensitive to particular choices of modeling assumptions and model specifications. The authors provide a computer program, MatchIt, to implement their new methodological approach.
Given the limits of our time and the difficulties with teaching old sinners the path of righteousness (e.g., learning R), we contemplated a simpler solution. Our approach is similar in spirit to Leamer's (1983) extreme bounds analysis (EBA). EBA involves 1)
formulating a general family of models, 2) identifying prior distributions for the parameters of interest, 3) analyzing the sensitivity of inferences on the parameters of interest to the choice of the prior distributions, and 4) obtaining a narrower range for inferences (Pagan, 1990, 104-105 ; see also Leamer, 1983 and Leamer & Leonard, 1983) .
A straightforward sensitivity test for model specification is to present the range of parameters and substantive effects for all estimated models. Ranges that vary wildly across models demonstrate uncertainty about the inferences the reader should draw from the analyses. 11 Furthermore, the inclusion of intervening or competing explanatory variables in the model will only heighten model sensitivity problems.
We demonstrate this simple approach by comparing models for third party settlement attempts with three possible independent variables: DemCom, JointIOs, and Hegemony. Seven model specifications are possible: three bivariate models, three models with two independent variables each, and one model with all three independent variables. The estimated parameters for DemCom vary from -0.058 to 0.086 across all seven models, the estimates for JointIOs vary from 0.103 to 0.117, and the estimates for
Hegemony vary from 5.03 to 7.14. The narrow range of the estimate for JointIOs indicates that its positive influence on the use of third parties is robust. However, the high correlation between DemCom and Hegemony produces very sensitive estimates for their parameters.
Similarly, we can report the sensitivity of our substantive effects. Suppose, for example, that we report the change in the predicted probability of a third party settlement attempt as we increase each variable from its minimum to its maximum value, while holding the other variables at their means. We would then calculate these substantive effects for each possible model and report the range in predicted probabilities for each variable. For our particular three-variable model, we find DemCom's worst possible effect is to decrease the likelihood of third party management by .1758 as it moves from its minimum to its maximum. At best, DemCom increases the probability of third party management by .2761. Increasing JointIOs from its minimum to its maximum results in a corresponding rise in the likelihood of third party usage of between 0.2684 and 0.3033.
Doing the same for Hegemony improves the chances of third party management by between 0.8253 and 0.901. 12 These results signal to the reader that the effects of JointIOs and Hegemony are fairly consistent, while the effect of DemCom varies depending on the model specification selected (although as we showed above, this is due to the high correlation between DemCom and Hegemony).
Reporting the range of estimated parameters and predicted probabilities for all possible models obviously becomes more difficult and time-consuming as the number of independent variables increases. Users of more complex models might find redemption by employing MatchIt (Ho et al., 2004) , simplifying their statistical models, or developing more theoretically rigorous formal models. Doing so more carefully addresses the various problems raised by Ray (2003) and Achen (2002 Achen ( , 2004 . At a minimum, though, providing information about the sensitivity of results to model specification would be better than merely reporting the "best" model.
Tenet #4: Do not control for variables that are related to each other or the key explanatory factor by definition.
Ray (2003) argues that common violations of this tenet occur when IR scholars include contiguity and distance or political similarity and regime type in the same empirical model. This is problematic because "the model containing both factors as control variables creates a background for the examination of empirical connections between other variables that is artifactually different from the 'real world' background in which the causal processes in question take place" (Ray, 2003, 18) . A model that includes both contiguity and distance, for example, produces artificial results because both are geographic features, and hence are related conceptually. Ray gives dispensation to include two control variables related by definition in the same model only when one wants to examine interaction effects (2003, (18) (19) .
By this logic, inclusion of Hegemony and DemCom in the same model would be unwise given that US CINC scores partially comprise DemCom. Similarly egregious would be the inclusion of two measures of systemic democracy, PropDem and DemCom in the same model. 13 Both are indicators of the same concept, although only the latter takes into account state capabilities and intensity of regime scores. Model 5 in Table 1 demonstrates what happens when both are included as independent variables. Because
PropDem and DemCom are highly correlated (ρ = 0.87), the sign for DemCom flips from positive to negative. Thus we would errantly conclude that the strength of the democratic community makes third party settlement attempts significantly less likely. This again illustrates why it is so essential to think carefully about the relationships among the independent variables in our models.
Benediction
Self-examination and reflection on Ray's tenets led us to several conclusions concerning the strength of the democratic community, its institutions, and peaceful dispute resolution. First, international organizations proved unconvincing as an intervening factor in the democratic community's causal connection to third party mediation. Instead, the strength of the democratic community may intervene in these institutions' promotion of peaceful settlement techniques. Likewise, US hegemony does not play the role that many commonly speculate it does, namely as a rival explanation for democratic peace. Instead, hegemony is a complementary explanation: American muscle may also bring about third party mediation and success, but it does not do so in place of a strong democratic community and its institutions. Last, incorporation of control variables, provided that they are not related by definition to any of our key independent variables, has little effect on the latter's performance. The democratic community's strength and institutional vitality promote third party mediation and its success; and this finding persists when we control for the joint regime type of the disputants, the salience of the issue at hand, and whether the agreements that are reached are merely functional or procedural.
Doctrinal lessons beyond those already laid out in Ray's tenets also arose from this exercise. Most important is the eternal primacy of theory (also see Zinnes 1980 
